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RELIABILITY ON THE AIR FORCE EASTERN" TEST RANGE
Captain David J. Kempi, Jr. 
Range Control Officer 
United States Air Force 
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida
ABSTRACT
The maintainability and operational reliability 
requirements to operate a one-point-five 
"billion dollar missile testing range with a 
myriad of highly technical systems, is obviously 
of great concern to sustain and improve launch 
programs.
INTRODUCTION
Everyone seems to be emphatically against the 
"sin of unreliability". Yet, you "will scarcely 
find two people with the same opinion on what 
constitutes reliability and how it can be 
achieved.
This paper elaborates on how we do "our thing" 
on the Air Force Eastern Test Range.
THEORY OF OPERATION
To begin the consideration of reliability, it is 
obvious that the AFETR cannot base reliability 
ratings of our equipment on the manufacturer's 
specifications. We want to trust him, and we 
do, but we have got to know for sure. We must 
have empirical data based on careful observation 
of prolonged performance. There is no other way.
When the manufacturer says he has built a part 
to last at least 1,000 hours, we thank him, 
activate the part and begin counting the hours. 
We count the hours every such part operates. 
The data-collection process never ends so long 
as we use any particular item. We keep a care- 
ful record of how long each one operates and of 
any other pertinent data about its operation.
As a result, the reliability engineers have 
ready access to information about the average 
number of hours such parts have functioned, 
about the shortest time any one of them function- 
ed, about the optimum conditions for their 
operation, and about the conditions which put 
the greatest stress on the part.
From this body of data, the reliability en- 
gineers can draw meaningful conclusions about 
each part, each tiny link in the vast chain that 
constitutes the Eastern Test Range operation.
They can determine with reasonable accuracy the 
times when preventive maintenance should be per- 
formed, when repairs will probably be needed, 
and when replacement will be necessary.
The engineer must make those decisions because 
only he can assess the importance of this part 
in the entire operation. Our data-gathering 
system provides him with the most reliable in- 
formation possible on which to base his de- 
cisions.
This method of gathering data and evaluating it 
to draw conclusions upon which to base future 
actions is the heart of our reliability system. 
It is an example of the technique of inductive 
reasoning one learns about in a basic course in 
logic, and it is the basis on which your special 
field, the science of reliability, rests.
The ETR is a one-point-five billion dollar 
range, with a myriad of highly technical systems. 
It stretches southeasterly from Cape Kennedy to 
the Indian Ocean, a distance of 10,000 miles. 
It has a work force of about 13,5^-6 people 
(including Air Force, other DOD agencies, Civil 
Service, and contractor personnel). Any 
successful launch will usually involve thousands 
of these employees and hundreds of thousands 
of the parts on which we need to have reliable 
data. Finding a more complex operation for 
which reliability data must be constantly 
available would be difficult, if not impossible,
A host of units, agencies, services and con- 
tractors must stay in constant contact with one 
another, exchanging critical information, 
equipment, and support. The Range must provide 
tracking data and other essential information 
to the ETR using agencies. By count, there are 
8l customers for our National Range services.
The Range also provides the facilities and 
support services necessary for assembly,, check- 
out, launch and in-flight operations of 
ballistic missiles, launch vehicles, and 
spacecraft.
It supports training test operations of tactical 
groups and operational weapons systems, and 
satellite operations of the allied nations on a
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cooperative basis.
And because we are a service agency "with many 
customers having various demands, we must be 
constantly prepared to meet emergency national 
defense commitments*
The operation of the Eastern Test Range is a 
complicated job, and in not one of these 
numerous responsibilities can we afford less 
than, iBBXimum reliability. The data on all of
our1 equipment must be complete, accurate, and
up-to-date,
lEhere was a time when our only concern was with 
shooting a ballistic missile down range; and we 
scheduled it to go when everything was ready to 
go. Whether the missile went at three one after- 
noon, at two the next day, or sometime the next 
week really didn't matter greatly. But when 
manned and orbital missions are planned, launch 
times become critical, and accurate reliability 
figures become essential to success.
The KTR's reliability and maintainability pro- 
gram has necessarily been tailored to match the 
changing responsibilities of the Range. Our 
engineers have developed math models which re- 
flect the reliability data gathered about the 
operation of all of the individual elements in 
each system. These models indicate how long a 
system should operate flawlessly and how long 
repair of particular breakdowns would require.
These math models are the end-product of the 
reliability system} however, the fundamental 
element in the system is the replacement or 
repair card on which operating personnel record 
all the pertinent performance data about a 
particular part. From this Repair Report Card 
and its thousands of fellow cards grow the 
mountains of data necessary to construct the 
math models which predict the reliability of 
entire systems.
The AFETR began using this report card when our 
R&M program first started. Our engineers 
studied many similar forms and cards used by 
various contractors and companies before de- 
ciding on a format   even that format lasted 
less than two years. As our requirements 
changed, so did the report card. In January, 
1969, we revised the card, putting it into its 
present form.
Our operating personnel fill out one of these 
cards for every repair or replacement they make. 
They also fill one out for every modification 
they perform, every unsatisfactory part they 
receive, and any unusual operation or adjustment 
they perform or observe. When the completed 
form reaches the originator ! s supervisor, he 
reviews it, then forwards it to the R&M Division 
for its use.
R&M prepares punch cards from the report cards 
and adds them to the other data being assembled 
for use in constructing the math models.
Basically, these math models consist of block 
diagrams showing all major units in a system and 
their relationship to each other. Its function 
is to provide a reliability configuration for 
each item of essential equipment in the system 
and for the system as a whole. A model not only 
predicts the reliability of its system, it also 
identifies the critical elements in the system 
and so provides a basis for deciding on the 
monitoring requirements for each item of critical 
equipment.
One more contribution which this reliability 
system makes to our operation is providing data 
about probable downtime in the event of an 
equipment malfunction. If a malfunction occurs 
during a countdown, for example, the launch 
director can immediately consult computer read- 
outs for the probability of repair before T minus 
zero. With that information from his reliability 
data pool, he can determine how long a hold to 
insert or whether he must scrub the mission for 
failure to support.
It will come as no surprise to you to learn that 
we try to find engineers with broad scientific 
background and experience. Assuming we get 
competent, conscientious personnel to operate 
the system at all levels, the problem then is to 
keep them motivated to perform at all times at 
the peak of their capacity. To try to provide 
this motivation, we concern ourselves with keep- 
ing them constantly aware of the role they and 
their report cards play in our overall mission.
For one thing, we stress the necessity to each 
man of the importance of filling out the report 
card honestly and objectively. If he inad- 
vertently sticks a screwdriver into an electrical 
connection and blows out the power supply, we 
want him to understand the need for an accurate, 
honest report of this unfortunate event. He 
must understand that we are not trying to find 
how well he does his job, but how the system can 
be kept functioning and how it can be made more 
nearly accident-proof.
An example of how such cooperation leads to an 
improvement occurred recently after a group of 
report cards showed that several operators had 
shorted screw-mounted resistors. Investigating 
engineers learned that the cover of this unit 
fitted so tightly the operator had to use a 
screwdriver to pry it loose. When he did so, he 
often shorted out the entire bank. As a result 
of the accurate reporting of this problem, the 
unit now has a cover which can be easily removed 
by hand.
The single step which we believe most helpful in 
convincing our personnel to report accurately is 
to keep them informed of the conclusions our 
Reliability Division reaches as a result of re- 
ceiving the report cards. This must be a two- 
way street. Whenever R&M assembles enough cards 
to reach a tentative decision about improvement 
of an operation, the improvement is sketched on 
a flip chart. The supervisor who originally
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installed the system takes the flip chart to the 
men who submitted the cards and explains -what 
the tentative corrective plan is and solicits 
their comments on the proposal. The men thus 
realize that their role is important to the over- 
all reliability mission. When our personnel 
understand this, we have no motivation problem.
CONCLUSIONS
Reliability is never treated lightly at any
level. The stronger the program management
is at the command level, the stronger the entire
program grows at every level down through the j
channels to that technician who once removed a j
cover with a screwdriver amid a shower of sparks, I
but now removes it easily by hand, knowing that j
this change in his operating conditions is a 1
result of a good system which his efforts are I
regularly making better. \
Since the beginning of the R&M program on the j
ETR our reliability batting average has im- j
proved significantly. 1
And the proof of that is the launch record. |
There have been no range caused "scrubs" of J
major missile or space launches for the last J
three years on this "man-rated" range. As to 1
the sin of unreliability, we are emphatically " I
against it! 1
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